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Summary 
Current research oflers alternative explanations to the ‘linkage’ 
between the pattern of diversification and performance. A t  least 
four streams of research can be identified. None of these can be 
considered to be a reliuble, predictive theory of successful 
diversification. They are, at best, partial explanations. The purpose 
of this paper is to propose an additional ‘linkage’, conceptual at this 
stage, that might help our understanding of the crucial connection 
between diversity and performance. The conceptual argument is 
intended as a ‘supplement’ to the current lines of research, rather 
than as an alternative explanation. 
For the past 35 years product-market diversification of large firms has continued at a rapid 
pace. Today, over two-thirds of the firms in the U.S.A. Fortune 500 are highly diversified 
and similar patterns of diversification exist in Western Europe and Japan (Rumelt, 1974; 
Pavan, 1972; Thanheiser, 1972; Pooley, 1972; Channon, 1973; Suzuki, 1980). As a 
consequence, interest in the relationship between corporate diversification and financial 
performance has grown among practitioners, academics, and public policy-makers. 
Accompanying this interest has been a spate of research on the patterns of diversification 
and the determinants of performance in diversified firms by the academic community. 
Concurrently, consulting firms have been actively promoting a variety of approaches for 
managing diversified firms. The results of these efforts have been mixed at best. There is, as 
yet, no overall theory that links diversification with performance and the linkage, if any, 
remains elusive. 
The purpose of this paper is to  propose a crucial linkage, which has largely been ignored 
in the literature on the relationship between diversification and performance; and to  show 
how this approach can add significantly to our managerial understanding of performance in 
the diversified firm. 
This linkage is referred to  as the ‘dominant general management logic’ (or dominant 
logic) and consists of the mental maps developed through experience in the core business 
and sometimes applied inappropriately in other businesses. 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE 
The purpose of this section is to review briefly the major academic research streams and 
consulting framework relevant to the relationships between diversity and performance. 
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These represent alternative approaches to research in this area. While significant literature 
exists in support of each of the streams of research outlined below, we will only reference 
and discuss the seminal works in each area. 
The strategy of diversification 
Pioneering work by Chandler (1962) and Ansoff (1965) established the motivations for 
diversification and the general nature of the diversified firm. Wrigley (1970) refined and 
extended Chandler’s study by investigating the various options open to  a diversifying firm. 
Building on the work of Chandler, Wrigley, and others, Rumelt (1974, 1977) investigated 
the relationships among diversification strategy, organizational structure, and economic 
performance. Rumelt used four major and nine minor categories to  characterize the 
diversification strategy of firms. The major categories were single business, dominant 
business, related business and unrelated business. These categories provide a spectrum of 
diversification strategies-from firms that remained essentially undiversified to  firms that 
diversified significantly into unrelated areas. Using statistical methods, Rumelt was able to 
relate diversification strategy to performance. The related diversification strategies- 
related-constrained and related-linked (e.g. General Foods and General Electric) were 
found to outperform the other diversification strategies on the average (relatedness was 
defined in terms of products, markets and technology). The related-constrained was found 
to  be the highest performing on the average. (In related-constrained firms most component 
businesses are related to  each other, whereas in related-linked firms only one-to-one 
relationships are required.) By contrast, the unrelated conglomerate strategy was found t o  
be one of the lowest performing on the average. 
Recently Nathanson and Cassano (1982) conducted a statistical study of diversity and 
performance using a sample of 206 firms over the years 1973-78. They developed a two- 
dimensional typology (market diversity and product diversity) for capturing diversification 
strategy that refines Rumelt’s categories. They found that returns (on the average) declined 
as product diversity increased, while returns remained relatively steady as market diversity 
increased. However, they also found that size plays an important moderating role on the 
relationships. For both the market and product diversity, smaller firms did well relative to 
larger firms in categories marked by no diversification and in categories of extremely high 
diversification. Larger firms did significantly better than smaller firms in the in-between 
categories-those characterized by intermediate levels of diversification. 
In both these studies linking diversification and performance (Rumelt and 
Nathanson/Cassano) the key point to  note is that choosing the generic strategy of 
diversifkation (how much and what kind of relatedness) is the key to achieving 
performance. 
Economic characteristics of individual businesses 
Porter (1980), among others, established that the characteristics of the various industries in 
which a firm participates, and the position of the firm’s businesses in these industries, 
impacts overall firm performance. 
Two studies have in fact empirically validated these influences for diversified firms. The 
widely discussed PIMS program of the Marketing Science Institute (see Schoeffler, Buzzell 
and Heany, 1974, for an introduction) has shown that variables such as market share and 
relative product quality directly influence the profitability of constituent businesses in large 
diversified firms. More recently, Montgomery (1979) has examined the performance 
differences in diversified firms using the market structure variables of industrial 
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organization economics. Montgomery found that diversified firms with higher levels of 
performance tended to  have well-positioned businesses in industries with ‘favorable’ market 
structures. 
In summary, for both studies (PIMS and Montgomery) the structure of the industries in 
which the firm competes and the competitive position of the firm’s businesses within these 
industries are the key determinants of performance. 
Portfolio concepts 
What are here called ‘portfolio concepts’ go by various names such as portfolio grids, SBU 
concepts, and SBU matrices. Although there are numerous slight variations among the 
approaches used by various consultant groups and firms, they all rely on a matrix or grid 
with two axes. The matrix classifies businesses by product-market attractiveness, or some 
variant of it, along one axis and by competitive position or some variant of it along the 
other axis. Typically these matrices are divided into either four or nine boxes. (For a 
thorough discussion see Hofer and Schendel, 1978.) The position (box) that each business 
occupies represents its strategic position and determines the role that the business should 
play in the corporate portfolio. This role involves varying degrees of cash generation or cash 
usage. Studies by Bettis (1979), and Haspeslagh (1982) suggest that managers use these 
concepts to varying degrees-as a tool or as dogma-in managing a diversified portfolio of 
businesses. 
For each variant of the portfolio concept the key points are: (1) the strategic position of 
each business determines its cash flow characteristics; and (2) it is the ‘balance’ of these cash 
flow characteristics of the collection of businesses that determines the overall performance 
of the diversified firm. 
Et cetera 
In addition to  the streams of research discussed above, a number of studies focusing on 
performance in large firms, by researchers concerned with organizational theory and human 
motivation, have appeared recently. Representative of this line of research are Peters and 
Waterman (1982), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Pascale and Athos (1981), and Ouchi (1981). 
While these studies do not consider the problems of managing diversity explicitly, they often 
do make some implicit recommendations on the issue, but the nature of the 
recommendations varies widely. (For example, Peters and Waterman suggest that ‘excellent 
firms’ confine their operations to businesses they know or ‘they stick to the knitting’.) 
The three streams of research lead to  somewhat different conclusions. To summarize, the 
linkage between diversity and performance would appear to be a function of: 
1. the generic diversification strategy (how much and what kind of relatedness), or 
2. the profit potential of the industries in which the individual businesses are positioned 
3.  the cash flow characteristics of the various businesses and the internal cash flow 
and the actual competitive position of the businesses in each industry, or 
balance for the total firm. 
Undoubtedly all three perspectives provide partial answers to the question. Just. how partial 
these answers are becomes more obvious when you consider that Rumelt (1974) was only 
able to explain less than 20 percent of the variance in performance, while Montogomery 
could only explain about 38 percent of the variance in performance. These results suggest 
that further conceptual development could enhance our understanding of diversity and 
performance. 
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The importance of ‘quality of management’ 
Bettis, Hall and Prahalad (1978) have argued that, if we move away from the traditional 
research preoccupation with central tendencies, but focus on outliers-the very high and 
very poor performers-we may learn more about the elusive linkage between diversity and 
performance. By studying just 12 firms, six of which were high performers and six low 
performers, across the three generic categories of dominant, related, and unrelated 
diversifiers (with a sample of four firms each, two in high- and two in low-performance 
categories), they concluded that the quality of management was as critical in explaining 
performance as any other factor. (It should be noted that their definition of quality was 
somewhat ambiguous.) The study was not based on the large sample (and it could not be by 
design, as their concern was with outliers), and the conclusions were tentative. (In a much 
larger study, Bettis and Mahajan (forthcoming) were able to show that the high- 
performance attributes usually attributed to related diversification were not recognized in 
the overwhelming majority of related diversifiers.) The real departure in the academic 
perspective on diversity and performance indicated by the study was the concern with very 
good and very poor performances in the same generic diversification category-or a desire 
to study outliers-and the inclusion of concept of the ‘quality of management’ as a major 
variable linking diversity and performance. 
Top management in a diversified firm: a distinct skill? 
Two in-depth clinical studies suggest that the skills that constitute the ‘quality of 
management’ in a single-business firm are distinct from a diversified firm; and that as firms 
diversify, top managers have to acquire those skills. Rajan Das (1981) studied one firm’s 
attempt to  diversify out of the core business (tobacco) and how it had to learn the process of 
general management in the new businesses into which it ventured. The conclusion was that it  
was not the quality of the business-its competitive structure-or the pattern of 
diversification per se that determined early failures and successes later, but the evolution of 
the top management and its ability to  acquire new skills and recognize that its approach to 
managing a diversifed firm must be different from the way it had managed the single- 
business firm. The study by Miles (1982) of tobacco companies in the U.S. and their 
attempts to diversify away from tobacco, also leads to a similar conclusion. The firms had 
to learn as much about general management in the diversiJiedJirm, as a distinct process and 
skill, as about the characteristics of the new businesses. Both these studies indicate that the 
work of top management in diversified firms is a distinct skill and can contribute to the 
success or failure of any one of the businesses within the firm or the firm as a whole. 
The management of a diversified firm 
Studies of the work of top management and the process by which they manage a diversified 
firm are not numerous. Bower (1972a) demonstrated that top managers influence the 
strategic choices made by unit-level managers by orchestrating the organizational context- 
the formal structure and systems. In other words, the tools of top management were 
administrative in character. He labeled the term ‘metamanagement’ (Bower, 1972b) to 
describe the job of top managers in diversified firms. Hamermesh (1977) outlined the 
process by which top managers intervene in a divisional profit crisis. Prahalad and Doz 
(1981) outlined, in detail, how top managers can use administrative tools to shift the 
strategic direction of a business. This line of research established both the broad scope of 
the work of top management, but more importantly how that influences the strategic 
choices made by lower-level managers at the business-unit level, thereby impacting on the 
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overall performance. There exists a logical, though only partially empirically, verified link 
between the quality of management-or the quality of the processes by which top managers 
influence the business-level managers in their work-and the performance of the firm. 
The two questions that we posed ourselves based on the literature were: 
1. If top managers in single-business firms had to  learn the process of managing a 
diversified portfolio, should top managers in diversified firms go through a similar 
learning process when they add new businesses? Is the task of top management in the 
diversified firm dependent on, or at least partially influenced by, the underlying 
strategic characteristics of the businesses? 
2. If the tools available to top managers in diversified firms to influence the strategic 
direction of businesses are essentially administrative as regards the organizational 
context, does it follow that the substance of businesses is irrelevant? In other words, 
can the same conceptual organizational context management capabilities suffice if 
the mix of businesses changes? 
THE ELUSIVE LINKAGE 
It is important before proceeding to  differentiate at least two distinct levels of general 
management in a diversified firm-that at the SBU or business level and the corporate 
management team. Often, in diversified firms, there tends to be an intermediate level of 
general management, called group or sector executives, between business level and 
corporate management. Our focus will be on the corporate management team, and its 
relationships with business- and group-level managers, as it pertains to  managing the 
totality of the firm. 
Given this focus on corporate management the conceptual framework linking diversity 
and performance, proposed in this paper, is based on the following premises: 
1. Top management of a (diversified) firm should not be viewed ‘as a faceless 
abstraction’, but as a ‘collection of key individuals’ (i.e. a dominant coalition) who have 
significant influence on the way the firm is managed. This collection of individuals, to a 
large extent, influence the style and process of management, and as a result the key resource 
allocation choices (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983). 
Few organizational events are approached by these managers (or any managers as being 
totally unique and requiring systematic study. Instead, they are processed through pre- 
existing knowledge systems. Known as schemas (see Norman, 1976, for a discussion of 
schemas), these systems represent beliefs, theories and propositions that have developed 
over time based on the manager’s personal experiences. At a broader unit of analysis, Huff 
(1982) implied the possibility that organizations’ actions can be characterized as schemas. 
An organizational schema is primarily a product of managers’ interpretations of 
experiences while operating within certain firms and industries. 
Schemas permit managers to categorize an event, assess its consequences, and consider 
appropriate actions (including doing nothing), and to do so rapidly and often efficiently. 
Without schemas a manager, and ultimately the organizations with which he/she is 
associated, would become paralyzed by the need to analyze ‘scientifically’ an enormous 
number of ambiguous and uncertain situations. In other words, managers must be able to 
scan environments selectively so that timely decisions can be made (Hambrick, 1982). The 
selection of environmental elements to be scanned is likely affected by a manager’s schema. 
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Unfortunately, schemas are not infallible guides to the organization and its 
environments. In fact, some are relatively inaccurate representations of the world, 
particularly as conditions change. Furthermore, events often are not labeled accurately, and 
sometimes are processed through inaccurate and/or incomplete knowledge structures. 
For the purposes of this research it is important to  understand what managers’ schemas 
actually represent. Kiesler and Sproul(l982) offer the following concise description: 
Managers operate on mental representations of the world and those representaions 
are likely to be of historical environments rather than of current ones (p. 557). 
(Furthermore, as Weick (1979) discusses, it is the schema concept that provides the vehicle 
for his concept of the social construction (or enactment) of a firm’s environment .) 
For the present purposes the schema concept is introduced as a general mental structure 
that can store a shared dominant general management logic. (The specific nature and 
content of this ‘logic’ is discussed below.) 
2. The strategic characteristics of businesses in a diversified firm, determined by the 
underlying competitive structure, technologies, and customers of specific businesses, vary. 
The differences in strategic characteristics of the businesses in the portfolio of the firm, a 
measure of strategic variety, impact the ability of a top management group to  manage. This 
premise implies that complexity of the top management process is a function of the strategic 
variety, not just the number of distinct businesses or the size of those businesses. For 
example, the management of a very large, primarily one-industry firm (e.g. General 
Motors), or the management of a diversified firm in strategically similar businesses (e.g. 
Procter & Gamble), is a lot simpler than managing a diversified firm in strategically 
dissimilar industries (e.g. General Electric). 
3.  Strategically similar business can be managed using a single dominant general 
management logic. A dominant general management logic is defined as the way in which 
managers conceptualize the business and make critical resource allocation decisions-be it 
in technologies, product development, distribution, advertising, or in human resource 
management. These tasks are performed by managing the infrastructure of administrative 
tools like choice of key individuals, processes of planning, budgeting, control, 
compensation, career management and organization structure. If the businesses in a 
diversified firm are strategically similar, one dominant general management logic would 
suffice. However, diversified firms with strategic variety, impose the need for multiple 
dominant logics. 
The dominant logic is stored via schemas and hence can be thought of as a structure. 
However, some of what is stored is process knowledge (e.g. what kind of process should be 
used in a particular kind of resource alleviation decision or how new technologies should be 
evaluated). Hence, more broadly the dominant logic can be considered as both a knowledge 
structure and a set of elicited management processes. (The actual content of this knowledge 
structure and how this context is established is discussed below.) 
4. The ability of a top management group (a group of key individuals), to  manage a 
diversified firm is limited by the dominant general management logic(s) that they are used 
to. In other words, the repertoire of tools that top managers use to  identify, define, and 
make strategic decisions, and their view of the world (mind sets), is determined by their 
experiences. Typically, the dominant top management logic in a diversified firm tends to  be 
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Figure 1. Dominant general management logic evolves due to 
influenced by the largest business or the ‘core business’ which was the historical basis for the 
firm’s growth (e.g. semiconductors at Texas Instruments, public switching and telephones 
at GTE). The characteristics of the core business, often the source of top managers in 
diversified firms, tend to  cause managers to define problems in certain ways and develop 
familiarity with, and facility in the use of, those administrative tools that are particularly 
useful in accomplishing the critical tasks of the core business (Figure 1). 
The sources of dominant logic 
Dominant logic, as we have defined it here, is a mind set or a world view or 
conceptualization of the business and the administrative tools to accomplish goals and make 
decisions in that business. It is stored as a shared cognitive map (or set of schemas) among 
the dominant coalition. It is expressed as a learned, problem-solving behavior. As such, in 
order to understand the difficulties faced by a top management group in changing the 
dominant logic, we need to  first examine the research streams that deal with the 
development of cognitive maps and the associated problem-solving behavior. We identified 
four streams of research-operant conditioning, paradigms, cognitive biases, and artificial 
intelligence-to highlight the process by which a dominant logic evolves (i.e. how the 
cognitive map originates and changes) and the difficulties in changing it or adding new 
logics to  one’s repertoire. The relationships of these four streams to problem-solving 
behavior are shown in Figure 2. 
Operant conditioning 
Skinner (1953), in his seminal work on operant conditioning, argued that behavior was a 
function of its consequences. Behavior could be understood by considering the 
contingencies that were administered by the environment in response to certain behaviors. 
Behavior that was reinforced was emitted more frequently in the future. By contrast, 
behavior that was ignored or punished (negative reinforcement) was likely to diminish over 
time. A dominant logic can be seen as resulting from the reinforcement that results from 
doing the ‘right things’ with respect to a set of businesses. In other words, when top 
managers effectively perform the tasks that are critical for success in the core business they 
are positively reinforced by economic success. This reinforcement results in their focusing 
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CONVENTIONAL PAST EXPERIENCE 
WISDOM AND SOLUTION BY 
(PARADIGMS) ANALOGY (PATTERN 
RECOGNITION IN 
CHESS GAMES) 
Figure 2. Conceptual foundations of dominant logic 
effort on the behaviors that led to success. Hence they develop a particular mind set and 
repertoire of tools and preferred processes. This in turn determines the approaches that they 
are likely to use in resource allocation, control over operations, and the approach to 
intervention in a crisis. If the firm acquires or develops a business for which the critical tasks 
for success are substantially different from those in the core business, because of operant 
conditioning the behaviors of top managers and the approaches they use to manage the new 
business are likely to  remain those that were appropriate for the core business even though 
they may be inappropriate in the new business. In other words i t  is difficult for a top 
management group to be effective in managing a new business by learning and using a new 
dominant logic in a short time. The problems faced by American Can (e.g. Pickwick 
International), and Exxon (e.g. office systems), in managing acquisitions of businesses 
totally different from their core businesses, in the early stages, are an illustration of the 
power of operant conditioning on the dominant logics used by top management. 
The power of paradigms 
The concept of dominant logic also derives direct support from Kuhn’s (1970) work on 
scientific paradigms and Allison’s (1971) work on the importance of alternate paradigms in 
the context of analyzing government actions during the Cuban missile crisis. 
Kuhn, a historian of science, argued that a particular science at any point in time can be 
characterized by a set of ‘shared beliefs’ or ‘conventional wisdom’ about the world that 
constitutes what he called the ‘dominant paradigm’. What Kuhn calls ‘normal science’ is 
carried out efficiently under this set of shared beliefs. In a sense, Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ is 
simply a way of defining and managing the world and a basis f o r  action in that world. Kuhn 
points out how difficult it is to shift dominant paradigms, and illustrates this with several 
examples such as the shift from the Ptolemaic view of the universe (earth-centered) to the 
Copernican view of the universe (sun-centered) in astronomy. The analogy from science to a 
business firm is simple and direct. The dominant paradigm and the dominant logic are 
conceptually similar but employed in different fields. 
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Allison used paradigmatic analysis to show how the adoption of a particular paradigm 
powerfully affects our evaluation of events. He characterized a paradigm as ‘a systematic 
statement of the basic assumptions, concepts and propositions employed by a school of 
analysis’. Different paradigms resulted in dramatically different analyses of his chosen 
example: the Cuban missile crisis. The parallel between Allison’s use of the word paradigm 
and our use of dominant logic is obvious. 
The pattern-recognition process 
As part of the development of ‘intelligent’ computer programs there have been numerous 
efforts to develop chess-playing programs (see Newell and Simon, 1972, for a review). 
Inevitably such research has required intense studies of how chess experts make decisions in 
a chess game. In particular, the decision-making and problem-solving process used by 
grandmasters and masters has been compared to that of lesser players (de Groot, 1965). 
These studies have shown that the better players could remember more ‘patterns’ of 
previous games than the lesser players. Simon (1979) estimated that class A players could 
remember about 1300 familiar patterns while masters or grandmasters remember about 
50,000. This ‘vocabulary’ of previous games lets players make effective decisions by 
comparison with earlier games. In other words, chess players decide on the basis of 
experience or ‘what worked before’, not on the basis of some best strategy or optimizing 
procedure. Now consider a situation where the design of the gameboard or rules of chess are 
changed. The stored ‘vocabulary’ of games is no longer as useful in this new game. 
Similarly, when the economic gameboard or rules are changed either by structural changes 
in existing businesses or by a diversification move, the vocabulary of economic moves 
stored through experience in the core business may no longer be as useful. In other words, 
solutions based on ‘past experience’ or solution by ‘analogy’ may be inappropriate. 
Cognitive biases 
A final area from which research results are suggestive of the concept of a dominant top 
management logic is cognitive psychology. The psychology of cognitive biases is the study 
of how people in making decisions sometimes make systematic (and often severe) errors (see 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, for an introduction and survey). When dealing with 
uncertain and complex tasks people often rely on a limited number of heuristic principles 
which greatly simplify the decision process. In general these heuristics are useful, but on 
some occasions they can result in significant errors. 
For present purposes the most interesting of these heuristic principles is what is called the 
availability heuristic (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, for a thorough discussion). 
Basically, the availability heuristic leads people to make decisions by using information that 
can easily be brought to  mind (i.e. information that is ‘available’). This often leads to severe 
and systematic errors. This field of research also suggests that decision-makers do not 
necessarily use analytical approaches to evaluate the information content of available data 
or search for ‘adequate information’ (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). For example, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) point out that one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged 
people by recalling such occurrences among one’s acquaintances even if it can be shown that 
it is an inappropriate basis for drawing such a conclusion. Obviously, for top managers, 
knowledge of the core business and the business they are most familiar with will be a 
significant source of available information. They tend to apply it to  other businesses where 
it may or may not be appropriate (Das, 1981). Research on cognitive processes suggests that 
the mind set and repertoire of tools that constitute the dominant logic are likely to be 
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inappropriately applied by managers confronted with a ‘different’ business, and that there 
is significant ‘learning’ that precedes change in those biases. The difficulty of operating in 
diverse businesses which require multiple dominant logics is obvious. 
STRATEGIC VARIETY AND THE DOMINANT LOGIC 
The premises outlined above help us develop a framework for assessing the linkage between 
diversity and performance. Essentially they relate strategic variety amongst businesses in the 
firm, and changes in it, with the appropriateness of the dominant general management 
logic(s) that top managers in that firm use. We will examine in the rest of the paper the 
problems that diversified firms face in relating strategic variety and the dominant general 
management logic(s). 
Strategic variety 
Strategic variety in a diversified firm depends on the characteristics of the mix of business 
the firm is engaged in. During the past decade top managers have tended to  reduce the 
strategic variety (not necessarily the number of district businesses) in the portfolio of the 
firm. This is accomplished, often, by divesting businesses that do not ‘fit7-those that 
increase strategic variety. Many of the businesses divested are profitable (e.g. Sperry’s sale 
of Vickers to concentrate on information technology, ITT’s sale of its bakery division). 
Divesting businesses t o  get more ‘focus’ to  the portfolio results from an implicit recognition 
that the demands on top management of strategic variety can be significant. Not all 
diversified firms have been proactive in reducing strategic variety. Some have been forced to  
divest businesses, after years of poor profit performance and an inability on their part to  
turn around the ‘sick businesses’. 
An alternative to the approach outlined above-reducing strategic variety by restricting 
the mix of businesses in the firm to those whose strategic characteristics are similar-is 
followed by firms like General Electric, Textron, or 3M. Typically, businesses with similar 
strategic characteristics tend to be grouped together, into ‘sectors’ for management 
purposes. As a result there is little strategic variety within a sector, but across sectors there 
can be significant differences. This approach reduces the strategic variety that top managers 
have to deal with by creating an intermediate level of general management. These group- or 
sector-level executives tend to manage the strategic direction of specific businesses within 
the sector. Conceptually, this arrangement explicitly recognizes the need to contain strategic 
variety for effective management. However, in practice, the role of sector executives and 
their relationship both with business-level managers and the top management of the firm 
can get unclear if top management of the firm attempts to directly influence the conduct of 
any one business or a group of businesses. 
Changing strategic variety 
So far we have considered how firms can contain strategic variety in a diversified firm, at a 
given point in time. But over time, even with an unchanging mix of businesses, the strategic 
variety can change. For example, the strategic characteristics of businesses can change due 
to changes in the structure of industries. The toy industry was changed, in a relatively short 
period of time, by the availability of inexpensive microprocessors. The combination of 
telecommunication and computers and deregulation is changing the financial services 
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industry. Globalization has changed the nature of competition in several industries such as 
TV, hi-fi, autos, steel, machine tools, etc. As a result, even firms which do not ostensibly 
change the mix of businesses will have to  cope with increasing strategic variety, as the 
underlying structural characteristics of businesses change. Top managers, as a result, must 
possess the ability to revise the dominant logic they used to manage those businesses. The 
inability of top managers both to  identify changing structural characteristics of businesses 
and accept the need for change in dominant logic(s), may provide at least a partial 
explanation for the difficulties traditional businesses like steel, machine tools, and autos 
have faced during the past 5 years in the U.S. 
An addition of a new business, either through internal development or acquisition, can 
also change the strategic variety within the firm. If the new business is distinctly different 
(e.g. General Motors’ acquisition of EDS, or General Electric’s acquisition of Utah 
International) the strategic variety it adds is easily recognized. 
In such acquisitions, top managers also recognize that hasty attempts t o  impose the 
dominant logic of the firm on the acquired business may be dysfunctional. Often the 
acquired firm is ‘left alone’, at least for a time. 
When a new business is created through internal development it is harder to recognize the 
different structural characteristics of that business compared to those in the current mix of 
businesses; more so if the new business is technologically not dissimilar to existing 
businesses. For example, the experience of the calculator, digital watch, and personal 
computer businesses at Texas Instruments illustrates the point. The dominant logic which 
worked so well for TI in the semiconductor business, when applied to  the new business, led 
to failure. A dramatic contrast is the early recognition at IBM that the personal computer 
business was structurally quite distinct. This recognition resulted in the creation of an 
independent business unit for managing that business. I t  was not subject to the dominant 
logic of the mainframe business. As the PC business evolves, and as it takes on the 
characteristics of the mainframe business, at least in some applications and with some 
customer segments, IBM may reimpose the dominant logic of mainframes on that business. 
To summarize, strategic variety in a diversified firm can change due to 
1. changes in the structural characteristics of the existing mix of businesses, or 
2. changes in the mix of businesses caused by acquisitions or internal development. 
In either case, top managers must explicitly examine the implications of changes in strategic 
variety. In other words, major structural changes in an industry have the same effect on the 
strategic variety of a firm as acquiring a new business. 
The task of top management is to constantly re-examine its portfolio to ascertain if there 
are perceptible changes in the strategic variety as well as explicitly to assess the impact of 
new businesses on dominant logic(s) in the firm. The task of top management under various 
combinations of ‘sources of strategic variety’ and ‘top management orientation’ give us six 
possible combinations, as shown in Table 1. In a firm with a single dominant logic, if the 
nature of the core business changes significantly, then top managers will have to  revise the 
dominant logic (A). If a new business is added, and is strategically similar (B), no change in 
dominant logic is needed. If, however, the new business is dissimilar, top managers have to 
create the capacity within the firm to cope with multiple dominant logics (C). In a firm 
operating with multiple dominant logics, if the nature of a significant business changes, 
then top managers may have to  revise the dominant logic applied to that business or regroup 
it under a different ‘sector’ or ‘group’ (D). If the new business is strategically similar to one 
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Table I .  Nature of top management tasks in diversified firms 
~~~ ~~ ~ 
Sources of strategic variety 
~~ 
Addition of a new business 
Significant structural 
Top management changes in core Similar to existing Dissimilar from existing 
orientation business businesses businesses 
Single dominant logic (A) (B) (C) 
Revise the dominant logic No change required Create the capacity for 
Multiple dominant logic(s) 
Add to the variety of 
Multiple dominant logic(s) (D) (E) (F) 
Revise the dominant logic 
or regroup it  under another 
sector 
Assign business to 
applied to that business appropriate ‘sector’ dominant logic(s) 
of the ‘groups’ or ‘sectors’ within the firm, then top managers may assign it to the 
appropriate sector (E). If the new business is dissimilar to the existing businesses, then top 
managers have to  add variety to  the dominant logics within the firm (F). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of dominant general management logic and the role of top managers in 
understanding and managing the logic(s), are important aspects to be considered in the 
research on diversity and performance. There are several implications of including these 
concepts in the study of diversity and performance. We will list some: 
Limits to diversity 
We have argued that the ‘real diversity’ in a managerial sense in a firm does not arise from 
the variety in technologies or markets or by the number of district businesses per se, but 
from the strategic variety among businesses requiring a variety in the dominant logics used 
by top management. Further, the variety of dominant logics that a top management can 
handle depends on the composition of the team, and their experiences, as well as their 
attitude toward learning. These factors suggest that we ought to recognize that the limit to 
the diversity of businesses within a firm is determined by the strategic variety, and that the 
strategic variety that a firm can cope with is dependent on the composition of a top 
management team. 
Undoubtedly, organization structure can help cope with increased strategic variety. One 
basic aspect of decentralization is to make decisions at the level where the proper expertise is 
available. In other words, the cognitive map is more likely to  fit the strategic imperatives of 
the business. However, all decision-making cannot be decentralized. For example, resource 
allocation decisions among a firm’s portfolio of businesses must be made. Furthermore, 
plans, strategies and budgets must be reviewed at the corporate level and managerial 
performance must be assessed. Hence organizational structure, although useful, is limited. 
It can attenuate the intensity of strategic variety that corporate-level management must deal 
with, but it cannot substitute for the need to handle strategic variety at the corporate level. 
An alternative or supplementary approach is to reduce the strategic variety in the 
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businesses of the firm-what has come to be known as ‘focus’ in the portfolio. An 
interesting variant on this is t o  impose a single strategic approach on each business. For 
example as Porter et al. (1983) discuss, Emerson Electric has a uniform goal across 
businesses of being the low-cost producer in each of its markets. Such an approach reduces 
strategic variety but may impose an inappropriate logic on a particular business. 
Interestingly, Emerson usually seeks to divest businesses that cannot meet this goal. 
Ultimately many firms exceed the limits of organizational structure in attenuating the 
intensity of strategic variety and/or cannot reduce or limit strategic variety adequately. 
These firms face the reality of having to deal intensively with strategic variety at the 
corporate level and the necessity of developing multiple dominant logics if performance is to 
be sustained. 
The bottom line is that each top management team at a given point in time has an inbuilt 
limit to the extent of diversity it can manage. Organizational structure and focus in the 
portfolio can help extend this limit but they cannot eliminate it. 
Diversity and performance: the hidden costs 
A high level of performance in a diversified firm requires the ability to ‘respond fast’ to  
competitor moves, as well as ‘respond appropriately’. One of the implications of our thesis, 
so far, is that top managers are less likely to ‘respond appropriately’ to  situations where the 
dominant logic is different, as well as not respond quickly enough, as they may be unable to  
interpret the meaning of information regarding unfamiliar businesses. The ‘hidden costs’ 
associated with diversifying into nonfamiliar businesses are shown schematically in Figure 
3. These ‘hidden costs’ are not explicitly recognized when the overall business climate is very 
favorable. Problems surface when the newly acquired businesses (which are strategically 
dissimilar) encounter competitive problems or are faced with a profit crisis. Top managers 
find themselves unable to respond to the crisis under those circumstances (Hamermesh, 
1977). 
Changing or adding dominant logics 
The process of adding dominant logics is, given the previous discussion, obviously an 
important aspect in the management of diversified firms. Also, as the argument so far 
suggests, the process of changing dominant logics is important to  any firm that encounters 
rapid change in the structure of the industries in which it competes. These issues revolve 
around the ability of the firm or its dominant coalition to  learn. Fortunately, there is a small 
but growing literature on organizational learning (see Hedberg, 1981, for an introduction 






Figure 3 .  The diversity and performance 
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First, let us consider the situation involved in changing the dominant logic of a (single- 
logic) firm. The explicit assumption here is that the structure of the core industry the firm 
competes in is or has changed significantly. 
In general it appears (see March and Simon, 1958; Downs, 1967; Terreberrey, 1968; Cyert 
and March, 1963; Starbuck, 1976; Hedberg, 1973; Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck, 1976) 
that changes in the ways organizations solve significant new problems (i.e. change dominant 
logics) are triggered by substantial problems or crises. Hedberg (1981) also suggests that 
opportunities or changes in key executives may also trigger learning, but here the evidence is 
small by comparison. (Key executive changes are often made in response to crises.) It would 
appear that in the overwhelming number of instances a crisis is needed t o  precipitate change 
(e.g. ‘Why fix it if it is not broke?’) Not only must there be a crisis but as Nystrom, Hedberg 
and Starbuck (1976), propose and illustrate, the initial response to the crisis is likely to be 
inappropriate. In other words the initial response is likely to draw on the now inappropriate 
but still current dominant logic. This, of course, provokes a deepening of the crisis and a 
search for other solutions. In other words survival is likely to  become dependent on finding 
a new logic. 
Given that the opportunity for learning has been elicited by a crisis (or other event) the 
organizational learning literature (e.g. Hedberg, 1981) suggests that unlearning must occur 
to make way for new mental maps. Unlearning is simply the process by which firms 
eliminate old logics and behaviors and make room for new ones. Interestingly, the more 
successful organizations have been, the more difficult unlearning becomes (Argyris and 
Schon, 1978; Starbuck and Hedberg, 1977). 
Given that these two preconditions, a precipitating crisis and a start of unlearning, have 
occurred, the stage is set for the kind of learning that can result in a new dominant logic. 
However, as Michael (1973) and Hedberg (1981) have observed, little is known about how 
organizations’ cognitive structures are changed. Hence, the discussion here must be largely 
speculative. Hedberg (198 1) makes four general suggestions: (1) making organizations more 
experimental; (2) regulating organizations’ sensitivity to  environmental changes to  an 
optimal level (neither too low nor too high); (3) redesigning organizations’ inner and outer 
environments; and (4) achieving a dynamic balance between stabilizing and destabilizing 
influences. Beyond these general areas the current authors suggest: (1) structuring the top 
management team to include individuals with significantly different experience bases; (2) 
encouraging top managers to  enrich their experience bases through sabbaticals and 
educational experiences; (3) rehearsing as a management team for a broad range of future 
industry scenarios; (4) separating economic evaluation from manager evaluation so that 
executives can be rewarded for experimenting even when projects fail; and ( 5 )  legitimizing 
dissent. Furthermore, in an interesting article about managerial responses to changing 
environments, Kiesler and Sproul (1982) suggest developing schemas that incorporate the 
expectation of change as a fundamental component. Unfortunately, again the ‘how to’ 
remains largely undefined. 
The discussion in this section so far has considered changing dominant logics, not adding 
new ones. Adding new logics implies retaining the old one and not unlearning it, but 
developing the ability to  deal simultaneously with other logics. This generally falls beyond 
what has been studied in the organizational learning literature. Diversification is often not 
triggered by a crisis, and unlearning as described above is not desirable. It appears that what 
must occur is some kind of meta-learning in which the dominant coalition learns to  
simultaneously conceptualize different type businesses. Perhaps some sort of meta-logic 
evolves that specifies the necessity of, and rules for, picking between partially contradictory 
mental maps. Further research here is obviously needed. 
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The meaning of ‘relatedness’ 
The concept of related o r  conglomerate diversification was typically based on an  analysis of  
the technological and market characteristics. The view presented here suggests that we may 
have t o  develop a concept of relatedness based on the ‘strategic similarities’ of businesses 
and the cognitive composition of the top management team. In other words relatedness may 
be as  much a cognitive concept as i t  is an  economic and technical concept. 
Future research 
The concept of a dominant logic presents opportunities to deepen our  understanding of the 
management of diversification and the relationships between diversity and performance. A 
first necessary step is t o  move beyond the purely conceptual stage to measurement of the 
construct, or  in other words, to being able to specify just what a particular dominant logic 
actually is. The  authors have had experience in trying to construct the dominant logic of  a 
firm by in-depth interviewing of the top management team, and believe that useful results 
and insights can be achieved. However, such an approach, though useful as a consulting 
framework, lacks the rigor necessary to establishing general results. Furthermore, 
quantification is complicated by the cognitive nature of the dominant logic. 
Decision-makers’ descriptions of their own policies are  often inaccurate (Hoffman, 1960; 
Slovic, 1969; Balke, Hammond and Meyer, 1973). Similarly, stated policies and intentions 
often vary from what is actually used. Argyris and Schon (1974) describe this as the 
difference between ‘espoused theories’ and ‘theories in use’ that actually govern behavior. 
These researchers suggest that a person’s theory in use cannot be obtained simply by asking 
for it. Creative questionnaires and analysis procedures, however, can be developed that 
elicit the true nature of the dominant logic. For example, the policy-capturing methodology 
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 1977) would seem to  be a 
powerful approach to measuring a firm’s dominant logic. 
Another approach to establishing a firm’s dominant logic could be through the use of 
historical analysis. As previous arguments have discussed, the dominant logic is developed 
as a result of  the experiences of the key executives. Hence, delving into the industry and firm 
experience of these key individuals would seem to be a fruitful approach, especially when 
coupled with in-depth interviews of the individuals and their immediate subordinates. 
A second important area for future research is the previously mentioned process of 
learning to use multiple dominant logics. The organizational learning literature deals 
primarily with changing cognitive maps. I t  does not deal with the process of learning to  use 
multiple, partially contradictory maps. Some firms have obviously been able t o  solve this 
problem. Logitudinal clinical investigation is necessary to determine how. 
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